Inflation, real interest tax wedges, and capital formation by William G. Dewald
1 The theoretical basis for the
present article is derived from
Dewald (1986).
2 There have been many detailed
studies of taxes that have
taken interactions with inﬂation
into account.  See, for exam-
ple, Feldstein and Summers
(1979), Fullerton and
Karayannis (1993), and King
and Fullerton (1984).










his paper focuses on how inﬂation inter-
acts with taxes and interest rates to affect
capital formation.1 It uses a simple
credit-market framework to explain how
inﬂation magniﬁes the distorting effects of
taxation when the tax treatment of interest
income and expense is not fully indexed to
inﬂation.2 The distortion involves a real tax
wedge consisting of the difference between
the real interest rate fully taxed investors
must pay when they borrow to invest and
the real after-tax interest rate that savers
earn.  This asymmetry in the way that fully
taxed investors and savers are affected by
income taxes leads to an increase in
inﬂation increasing the real tax wedge in
credit markets.
Either eliminating inﬂation or
indexing the tax treatment of interest
income and deductible interest expense to
inﬂation would reduce this real tax wedge
and consequently increase private saving
and business capital formation.  Eliminating
inﬂation or its induced tax effects on interest
rates would decrease nominal rates for two
reasons:  Absent inﬂation, interest rates
would not contain an inﬂation premium;
hence, nominal interest rates would be
lower.  Furthermore, if there were no inﬂa-
tion, or if the tax treatment of interest
income and deductible interest expense
were indexed, nominal interest rates
would fall because saving as a function of
the interest rate would tend to increase.
With the higher after-tax returns that
would result from removing the tax on the
inﬂation premium in nominal interest
rates, savers would save more.  An
increased supply of saving would in turn
lower before-tax real interest rates and
thereby stimulate the business investment.  
Not everyone would beneﬁt from elim-
inating the inﬂation-induced tax distortion
in credit markets, however.  Although
eliminating inﬂation or indexing the taxes
on interest income and expense would raise
private saving and nonresidential investment,
governments and homeowners would  face
higher real borrowing costs and real interest
outlays.  This would happen because  after-
tax real interest rates are not only the
effective real rates that savers earn; they
are also the effective real rates at which the
government  and homeowners borrow.  Fully
taxed borrowers borrow at a before-tax real
interest rate, but the government borrows
at an after-tax real rate because its interest
payments to the public add to the income
on which it collects taxes.  Homeowners
also borrow at an after-tax real rate.  They
are not taxed on the real beneﬁts from living
in their homes, which are effectively income,
and in the United States, unlike some other
countries, their related interest costs can
generally be deducted from taxable income.
In summary, either eliminating inﬂation
or indexing the tax treatment of interest
income and expense to inﬂation would
stimulate private saving and, in turn, busi-
ness investment, but it would decrease tax
receipts on interest income and the tax
deductions that subsidize home ownership.
INFLATION AND 
THE TAX WEDGE
Stiglitz (1973) and Auerbach (1983),
among others, have shown that the invest-
ment decisions of fully taxed investors are
motivated by before-tax, not after-tax, real
interest rates.  It is intuitively reasonable
to specify that investment decisions depend
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tax rates differ.  Fazzari and
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on real returns and real interest rates, and
thus are not inﬂuenced by inﬂation.  Investors
presumably cut through the veil of inﬂation
to make decisions based on real fundamen-
tals. However, it is counterintuitive to specify
that investment decisions depend on
before-tax, not after-tax, real interest rates.
After all, taxes are certainly an important
cost factor for businesses.  Nevertheless,
there is a good argument for why borrower-
ﬁnanced investment would not be directly
affected by a uniform tax rate that applied
to both investment income and the deduc-
tions for interest expense.  Suppose the cost
of an investment is c, the expected return
in one period is 1+ g, and the interest cost
in one period is 1+ i.  The investor would
continue to invest as long as net proﬁt a
was not negative:  a = (1+ g) – c(1+ i).  The
investment decision would not be affected
by changes in the income tax rate, t, since
the appropriate choice to maximize (1– t)a
would also maximize a.  Hence, for fully
taxed investors facing the same tax rate on
their earnings and their deductible costs,
the before-tax interest rate, i, inﬂuences
investment decisions, not the after-tax
interest rate, i(1– t).
The argument is that investors would
rank alternative investments on the basis of
the expected proﬁtability of each investment,
net of interest and other costs.  A change 
in the tax rate would change the expected
proﬁtability associated with alternative
investments, but it would not change the
ranking of their expected proﬁtability.  The
investment that was ranked as the most
proﬁtable when the tax rate was 50 percent
would still be the most proﬁtable when the
tax rate was reduced to 40 percent.  On the
basis of this argument, investment decisions
are speciﬁed to depend on before-tax interest
rates, which would affect the ranking of
investment alternatives with respect to
expected proﬁtability.
To restate this critical argument:
Prospective investors who ﬁnance their
investments by borrowing would make the
same rankings of the expected proﬁtability
of particular investment alternatives regard-
less of the level of tax rates.  Proﬁts, of course,
would differ with different tax rates, but as
long as the same tax rate were applicable to
both investment returns and deductible
interest expenses, the level of tax rates
would not inﬂuence the rank order of the
proﬁtability of investment alternatives.3 An
implication is that prospective before-tax
real rates of return on investments and
prospective before-tax real rates of interest
at which such returns are discounted would
affect investment decisions, not after-tax
rates of return or after-tax rates of interest.
Thus, tax rates would not inﬂuence invest-
ment choices directly.  
Tax rates, however, would inﬂuence
investment choices indirectly because tax
rates would affect saving and, indirectly,
the market-clearing real interest rates at
which investment is ﬁnanced.  Increasing
inﬂation and/or tax rates would lower savers’
after-tax interest-rate earnings and thus
decrease saving, thereby raising before-tax
real interest rates and reducing investment.
These points are clariﬁed by reference to
the following ﬁgures.  A numerical
example appears on p. 34.
In Figure 1, real investment by fully
taxed borrowers varies inversely with a
before-tax real interest rate: rB= i – p,
where i is the nominal interest rate and p
is the inﬂation rate.  Real saving, S, in con-
trast to real investment, is speciﬁed to vary
directly with an after-tax real interest rate:
r L = i(1– t) – p.  When both the tax rate, t,
and the inﬂation rate, p, are zero, the real
rate for borrowers, rB
0, equals the real rate
for lenders, r L
0 .  The upward-sloping saving
function intersects with the downward-
sloping investment function at point A to
determine the equilibrium market interest
rate, rB
0 and saving (= investment), S0.  
As noted, enactment of a tax on interest
income leaves the investment function
unaffected.  But, as depicted in Figure 2,
the upward-sloping saving function
depends on the after-tax real interest rate.
The saving function rotates up and to the
left with an increase in the tax rate from
zero to t1 .  As a result, the credit-market
equilibrium would shift from A to B, the
equilibrium real rate for borrowers would
increase from rB
0 to rB
1 , the equilibrium real




0 to r  L
1 , and the equilibrium level of
saving would decrease from S0 to S1.  The
difference between rB
1 and r  L
1 represents a
real tax wedge, essentially reﬂecting that
the difference between the borrowing rate
and lending rate on such credit-market
transactions is transferred to the government
in taxes. 
Figure 3 illustrates what happens
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taxation.  As noted above, rankings of
alternative investments are independent of
both the tax rate and inﬂation.  Consequently,
real investment, as a function of the nominal
interest rate, shifts up by exactly the increase
in the inﬂation rate, p1.  In contrast, when
savers are taxed on their interest income,
the saving function must rise by more than
the increase in the inﬂation rate.  As shown
in Figure 3, to get the same saving when
inﬂation increases to p1 with tax rate, t1,
the nominal interest rate would have to
increase by p1 /(1  – t1).  That is an amount
such that (1  – t1) of it is equal to the
increase in inﬂation.  Thus, an increase in
inﬂation shifts the saving function up by
p1 /(1  – t1), which, given that the tax rate is
positive but less than one, is greater than
the upward shift in the investment function,
which shifts up by p1.  Consequently, an
inﬂation increase from zero to p1 would
move the credit-market equilibrium from
B  to C  in real terms. The nominal interest
rate is determined by the equilibrium point,
D, which is at the intersection of real saving
and real investment speciﬁed as functions
of the nominal interest rate.  The result is a
higher market-clearing nominal interest
rate, i2, and a higher before-tax real  interest
rate, rB
2 , but a lower after-tax real interest
rate, rL
2 , and lower level of saving, S2.
Expressed  another way, an increase in
inﬂation from zero to p1 would increase
the real tax wedge.  
The effect of inﬂation on real interest
rates is really the crux of the credit-market
distortion associated with the interaction
of inﬂation, taxes, and interest rates.  The
distortion causes a change in the allocation
of resources from what it would be in an
inﬂation-free environment.  
It can be shown that if interest income
and expense are not indexed to inﬂation in
the tax structure, the real tax wedge equals
the tax rate times the nominal interest rate. 
Note that
•  with zero inﬂation, the real tax 
wedge is rB
1 – r  L
1 = t1rB
1 , but
•  with inﬂation p1, the real tax 
wedge is  
rB
2 – r  L
2 = (i2 – p1) – [i2 (1–t1) – p1] = t1i2.
Thus, when inﬂation increases from
zero to p1, the real tax wedge increases by
t1(i2 – r  B
1 )=t1[(r  B
2 + p1) – rB
1 ].
The inﬂation-induced increase in the 
real tax wedge incorporates three
elements: the tax rate, t1, the increase 
in the inﬂation rate, p1, and the inﬂation-
induced increase in the before-tax real
interest rate, .
The incidence of inﬂation-induced tax
increases would depend on the investment
and saving function elasticities.  If saving
were perfectly inelastic with respect to
interest rates, the full incidence would fall
on saving.  If investment were perfectly
inelastic with respect to interest rates, the
full incidence would fall on investment.
Since empirical studies tend to conﬁrm
that saving is comparatively inelastic, it is
reasonable to conclude that much of the
impact of an increase in inﬂation on taxes
would fall on savers, although any induced
reduction in saving would be reﬂected in
reduced capital formation.   
To reiterate the argument in Figure 3,
increased inﬂation would effectively raise
the tax on savers’ interest income and
lower their real after-tax interest earnings.
In response, they would plan to save and
lend less, which would raise the real
interest rate on borrowing to ﬁnance
investment.  Either an increase in inﬂation
or an increase in tax rates would increase
the real tax wedge; that is, it would
increase the before-tax real rate that inﬂu-
ences investors but decrease the after-tax
real rate that inﬂuences savers.  Since an
inﬂation increase would shift the saving
function back and thereby induce a
decrease in investment, it has the same
qualitative effect in reducing capital forma-
tion as an increase in tax rates. 
INDEXING THE TAX TREAT-
MENT OF INTEREST INCOME
Figure 4 shows that the beneﬁts of
eliminating inﬂation on capital formation
r r
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can be obtained by indexing the tax treat-
ment of interest income and expense to
inﬂation.  Saving is now speciﬁed to depend
on an after-tax real interest rate where the
tax is based on a before-tax real interest
rate—not, as previously, on a before-tax
nominal interest rate.  Consequently, both
the investment function and the saving
function are now speciﬁed to be indepen-
dent of the inﬂation rate.  Both functions
shift up by exactly the increase in inﬂation.
Under indexing, for any inﬂation rate,
there would be a lower-equilibrium nom-
inal interest rate and a lower before-tax
real rate but a higher after-tax real rate for
savers.  The real tax wedge would not be
eliminated, but it would be made indepen-
dent of inﬂation.  The equilibrium nominal
before-tax interest rate would be i3,  the
before-tax real rate would be rB
1 , the real
after-tax rate would be rL
1  = rB
1  (1– t1), and
the real tax wedge would be t1rB
1 . Other
than the nominal interest rate, which
would fully reﬂect inﬂation, the real
before-tax and after-tax interest rates and
real saving and investment would be
precisely the same under indexing as if
inﬂation were eliminated.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The roughly 3 percent inﬂation rate
over recent years is low compared with
inﬂation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
But 3 percent is not zero.  As the
numerical example in the shaded 
insert shows, even 3 percent inﬂation
could be linked to a substantial real 
tax wedge.  
Eliminating inﬂation remains a 
putative goal of monetary policy.  If inﬂa-
tion is not eradicated completely, it is
reasonable to consider designing tax 
policies to avoid real distortions in the
allocation of resources that result from 
the interaction of inﬂation, interest rates,
and taxes.  Indexing income tax rates to
inﬂation, but not the tax treatment of
nominal interest income and expense,
leaves the interest-sensitive capital-forma-
tion process subject to potentially signiﬁcant
distortions.  Although inﬂation-indexed
Treasury bonds were introduced in 1997 to
index nominal interest returns to inﬂation,
these nominal returns continue to be taxed
as ordinary income.  Therefore, simply
indexing interest rates to inﬂation does 
not index the tax treatment of interest
income and expense to inﬂation and thus
does not fully protect the credit market
from distortions that accompany increases
in inﬂation.  
Effectively indexing the tax treatment
of interest income and expense would pre-
vent inﬂation from arbitrarily raising tax
rates on saving and reducing corporate
investment as it did in the 1970s and early
1980s.4 For whatever technical or political
reasons, indexing the tax treatment of
interest income and expense is difﬁcult to
4 Fazzari and Herzon (1996)
show how indexing capital
gains taxation for inﬂation
would increase incentives to
invest, but they may not recog-
nize that even if capital gains
are indexed for inﬂation, the
taxation of nominal interest
income would lower real rates
to savers but raise real rates to
borrowers thus raising the cost
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implement.  Consequently, price-level sta-
bility becomes all the more important a
monetary policy objective, the achievement
of which would reduce distortions in credit
markets that retard saving, investment, and
capital formation. 
A FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT
COROLLARY
The corollary is that real taxes would
tend to fall and real federal budget deﬁcits
would tend to rise when inﬂation declines
or interest income and expense are
A numerical example further illus-
trates the argument in this article.  The
example is based on a simple linear credit
market-model with taxes and inﬂation.
Units of saving and investment are in
billions of dollars.
In the no-indexing case, saving is a
function of an after-tax interest rate, rL
= i(1–t) –  p.  Taxes paid by savers depend
on the nominal interest rate, i.  If, by
assumption,  the tax rate is 40 percent and
the inﬂation  rate is 3 percent, the nominal
interest rate  is 10 percent.  Savers earn a 
6 percent  after-tax  nominal interest rate,
i.e., [10 percent x  (1 – 0.4)].  Their after-tax
real rate of return  is 3 percent, i.e., [10 percent
x  (1 – 0.4) – 3 percent]. The before-tax real
interest  rate inﬂuencing  investors is 7 per-
cent, i.e.,  (10 percent – 3 percent).  The
difference between  before-tax and after-tax
real interest  rates is 4 percent,  which is the
40 percent tax on the 10 percent nominal
interest rate.  This 4 percentage point dif-
ference is the real tax wedge.  It would be
associated  with real saving and investment
of $20 billion.
If inﬂation were eliminated altogether,
there would still be a real tax wedge, but it
would be reduced by the magnitude of the
tax on the decrease in the interest rate on
which savers are taxed.  Compared with
the 3 percent inﬂation case, eliminating
inﬂation would reduce the real before-tax
interest rates from 7 percent to 6.25 percent
but raise the real after-tax interest rate from
3 percent to 3.75 percent, thus decreasing
the real tax wedge from 4 percent to 2.5
percent, thereby inducing an increase in
saving from $20 billion to $27.5 billion. 
Fully indexing the tax treatment of
interest income for savers would make
saving a function of an after-tax rate that
is independent of inﬂation:  rL = (i  – p)(1 –  t).
Taxes paid by savers depend on the real
interest rate, (i –  p), and not the nominal
interest rate, i.  Even with 3 percent inﬂa-
tion,  but with the introduction of indexing,
the nominal interest rate would fall from
10 percent to 9.25 percent, the real before-
tax  interest rate would fall from 7 percent
to 6.25 percent, the real after-tax interest
rate would rise from 3 percent to 3.75
percent, the real tax wedge would fall
from 4 percent to 2.5 percent, and saving
(= investment) would rise from $20 billion
to $27.5 billion.  These are precisely the
same real magnitudes that would result
from eliminating inﬂation.
If taxes were also eliminated, the
real interest rate that clears the credit
market in this example would be 5 per-
cent, the real tax wedge would be zero,
and saving (= investment) would be an
undistorted $40 billion.  
SOME EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON TAX WEDGES AND
CAPITAL FORMATION: AN EXAMPLE
Numerical Example
Saving (no indexing):  
Saving (indexing):  
Investment: 
Equilibrium:
S I = .
I i = - - [ ] 90 1000 p .
S i = - + - ( ) - ( ) [ ] 10 1000 1 p t .
S i = - + - ( )- [ ] 10 1000 1 t p .FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
35
JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1998
5See Makin (1985) and the
record of comments by
Feldstein in Aaron (1976),
page 80.
6 Tanzi (1984).
indexed to inﬂation.  By contrast, a
conventional view is that indexing the
taxes on interest income and expense to
inﬂation would lower nominal interest
rates and thus decrease the government
deﬁcit.5 The argument is that, “. . . even if
the fall in the nominal rate [because of
indexing] was only 1 percentage point (a
figure that can be considered conservative),
it would still have important effects.  It
would, for example, by reducing interest
costs in the public debt, reduce the U.S.
ﬁscal deﬁcit by $8 billion . . . .”6 Such an
argument is questionable.  It does not take
into account that the government borrows
at an effective after-tax real interest rate
because it collects taxes on the interest it
pays to taxpayers.  
The present argument has shown that
indexing the taxes on interest income and
expense or reducing inﬂation would
increase, not decrease, after-tax real
interest rates and thus increase the
effective real interest rates at which the
government borrows.  In its simplest
terms, the argument is that indexing
interest taxation to inﬂation would elimi-
nate one source of federal revenue—the
tax on the inﬂation premium in nominal
interest rates.  Consequently, indexing
interest taxation or eliminating inﬂation
would increase, not decrease, the real fed-
eral budget deﬁcit.  The fallacy in the
argument that indexing interest taxation to
inﬂation would decrease the deﬁcit is in
not taking into account that indexing
would tend to raise the effective real
interest rate on government borrowing and
hence raise the real budget deﬁcit.
CONCLUSION  
Either lowering inﬂation or indexing
the taxation of interest income and expense
would reduce real taxes and stimulate
saving and nonresidential investment by
eliminating a major distortion that inﬂuences
capital formation and potential growth.
Absent an effective program to index
interest income and expense to inﬂation,
keeping inﬂation low and, in principle,
eliminating it represents an effective way to
minimize the real tax wedge between the
real rates that inﬂuence investors and savers,
thereby stimulating capital formation.  The
bottom line is that price stabilization
policies  are pro-growth policies. 
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